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Abstract –Decisions about residential lot size and square footage are influenced by a 
variety of determinants ranging from zoning regulations to neighborhood characteristics.  
Our theoretical analysis suggests that the property tax rate could also affect residential 
lot sizes and the sizes of newly constructed houses.  Using descriptions for over 36 
thousand houses built in New Hampshire between 1985 and 2006, we find empirical 
evidence that higher property taxes are indeed associated with both smaller lots and 
smaller houses.  On average, higher property tax rates are associated with more 








Housing and the local property tax are intimately connected in the United States.  
In fiscal 2008, property tax payments accounted for 72.3 percent of local tax revenue 
(U.S. Census Bureau).  A substantial portion of those property taxes were levied on 
homeowners and owners of rental housing.  These property owners, in turn, benefitted 
from the municipal services that those property taxes helped to finance. 
 England and Ravichandran (2010) explore the theoretical connection between 
taxation of real estate and a developer’s profit maximizing decision about how much 
physical capital to place on a vacant lot of a given size. They show through numerical 
simulations that a higher property tax rate would favor construction of houses with fewer 
stories and with more compact footprints. In this paper, we continue to investigate 
whether the reliance of municipal governments on the property tax might affect the 
design of single-family homes. We extend the England-Ravichandran theoretical model 
by (1) allowing lot size to be a choice variable,  (2) modeling explicitly the land 
acquisition cost along with construction cost, and (3) presenting detailed comparative 
static analysis of the impact of property tax rates on lot size, building size, and building 
height that provides the theoretical basis for our empirical study. A case study of newly 
constructed single-family homes in 41 New Hampshire towns and cities from 1985 
through 2006 is then presented to investigate empirically the connection between 
property taxation and residential housing development.  Our case study shows evidence 
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 Suppose that a builder plans to construct a new house. The builder needs to 
calculate the lot size and structure size that will maximize her profit. If there exists a 
minimum lot size requirement, then the decision about the lot size (A) may be influenced 
by zoning regulations.2  Let F be the area of the building footprint.  
F A    0 1       (1) 
where ω is the footprint ratio, that is, the proportion of the lot being occupied by a 
structure.  Define U to be the portion of A left as open space; i.e., 
  (1 )U A           (2) 
The floor space of the structure built on the lot, denoted as K, can be expressed as: 
  K h F h A      1h        (3) 
where h is a height index to derive the total floor space given the footprint. In the 
simplest case of a straight-up, square building, h is the number of floors.  
																																																								
1	We do not analyze the connections between the property tax and rental housing in this paper.  For a recent 
contribution to that literature, see Tsoodle and Turner (2008).	
2	The minimum lot size requirements can result in censoring of lot size for some observations. Similarly, 
there are height restrictions in some municipalities so that some observations of building height may be 
censored. Zoning regulations tend to vary across neighborhoods in the same municipality and change over 
time. Without detailed GIS information, it is difficult to identify the censored observations. In our empirical 
study, we use a dummy variable indicating the presence of zoning regulation and the median minimum lot 
size requirement for a municipality as indicators of strictness of zoning laws in the municipality.  
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A land development decision involves multiple dimensions: The builder needs to 
decide on the lot size (A), the portion of the lot used for construction (ω), and the height 
of the structure (h). As seen in (3), the decision about floor space (K) is implied by the 
decisions about A, ω, and h. Alternatively, we may say that the development decision 
involves the determination of A, K, and h. The optimal choices of A, K, and h from the 
builder’s point of view are likely profit driven. 
Before formulating the profit function for the builder, it is important to first 
examine the value of (and therefore the price a home buyer is willing to pay for) a 
developed parcel. A home owner derives satisfaction from both the building and the open 
space on the developed parcel. Let S be the service flow derived from both K and U. It is 
reasonable to expect a certain degree of substitutability between land and physical capital 
in the production of housing services. Assume S production can be described by a 
constant elasticity of substitution production function.3 
  
1
( (1 ) )S B bK b U           (4) 
According to (4), the elasticity of substitution between K and U is 1
1 . A builder will 
presumably take into account the willingness of homebuyers to substitute yard area and 
landscaping for interior living space (Cho, Clark, Park and Kim 2009).  
																																																								
3	b is a share parameter, and B is a scale parameter. Even though B is not an important parameter in our 
theoretical analysis, but it has to be chosen carefully in a numerical study especially when the elasticity of 
substitution between K and U is less than one (see the Appendix). 
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The annual rent paid to use the developed parcel A will depend on its service flow 
and also a wide variety of neighborhood and location characteristics that can be both 
desirable and undesirable. For simplicity, assume the following rent function.4 
  ( , , ) ( , )R g S N Z S f N Z         (5) 
where N are the neighborhood and location characteristics, and Z are the land related 
regulations. A longstanding thesis of urban economics is that distance from and access to 
employers, retail outlets, and service providers will play an important role (Capozza and 
Helsley 1989).  Sirmans, Macpherson and Zietz (2005) report that pleasant views add 
value to residential parcels.  Chay and Greenstone (2005) have found that lower 
concentrations of suspended particulates are associated with higher house prices.  Cho, 
Clark, Park and Kim (2009) find evidence that proximity to parks and bodies of water 
increases the value of house lots. Finally, as Oates (1969) pointed out decades ago, the 
quality of local public services such as schools is an important neighborhood 
characteristic that can also influence the value of housing.5 
Land use regulations at the local level can also have a complicated set of 
influences on residential land rents. A well-designed zoning system can protect 
homeowners from nuisance-creating commercial and industrial land uses.  An overly 
bureaucratic system of land use regulations will slow down the construction process and 
																																																								
4	We are in debt to one of the referees for suggesting this simplified rent function that makes the 
subsequent analysis much more tractable without much loss of generality. 
5	These findings assist the specification of our empirical models. For example, we include dummy 
variables to indicate waterfront properties and properties near the White Mountains. Waterfront lots and 
other lots in waterfront communities will command higher prices in the land market. We also expect that 
residential lots in towns with mountain views and with lots of national forest land will garner higher rents.	
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reduce the number of residential lots offered on the land market.  In either case, zoning 
and other forms of land use regulation are likely to be accompanied by higher prices for 
residential lots (Ihlanfeldt 2007, Lutz 2009).  Minimum lot size requirements, however, 
favor bigger lots if those zoning rules are binding (Newburn and Berck 2006). 
 Let Rt and Pt be respectively the rent and price of the developed parcel at year t. 
Let τ be the property tax rate levied on the developed parcel. For simplicity, assume that 
the assessed value of the developed parcel is equal to its present value so the annual tax 
payment is τ·Pt.
6 Also assume that the rent and tax are collected at the beginning of year 








   

,       (6) 
where r is the annual discount rate. At its most fundamental level, land price is governed 
by the present value of expected after-tax agricultural rents at the edge of a metropolitan 
region and urban location rents at a parcel’s specific location within that region (Capozza 
and Helsley 1989). Iterating on the above equality and assuming that the annual rent 
grows at a rate of ρ because of income and population growth, the present value (the price 
at year 0) of the developed parcel can be expressed as follows.8  
																																																								
6	An underlying assumption here is that the land and the building sited on the land are taxed at the same 
rate (τ). The vast majority of municipalities in the United States apply the same tax rate to both the land and 
the structure on the land. Some cities in Pennsylvania are an exception to this generalization.	
7	Thanks to one of the referees for suggesting the expression of Pt and the subsequent derivation of P0.  
8	The stability condition to derive (7) requires that (1 )(1 ) (1 ).r       The time subscript (0) is 











   
      (7) 




(1 )(1 ) (1 )
r
P S f N Z
r  
 
      
    (8)  
The part in the square bracket represents the price a builder receives for one unit of 
housing services, which depends on expected rental growth rate, discount rate, property 
tax rate and characteristics of the surroundings and land regulations. 
The cost to develop a parcel is specified as follows: 
1 2( , , ) ( )
hC h K A c K A A           (9) 
where , 1c    and 1 2, 0   . There are two components in the cost function (9). The first 
component is the construction cost, which depends on the square footage (K) and the 
height (h) of the structure. The second component is the cost of acquiring a building lot. 
1  is the base cost of the lot at the minimum required size ( A ). For any lot size greater 
than the minimum lot size, it can be desirable for home buyers but it imposes additional 
costs to the builder. The minimum lot size requirement dictates the minimum size of a lot 
that the builder has to acquire, but the builder can always acquire a bigger lot if it brings 
in higher profit. 
Define 
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A profit maximizing builder may choose values of A, h, and ω to maximize her 
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 (13) 
The LHS of (11), (12) and (13) represents the marginal benefit of increasing 
footprint ratio, building height and lot size respectively, while the RHS of (11), (12) and 
(13) represents the marginal cost of increasing footprint ratio, building height and lot size 
respectively. Both (11) and (12) imply that  
*
1
* * * * 2
1 1 1 1
( ) ( )
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b
h b h c h
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
        (14) 
where h*, ω*, and A* denote the optimal building height, the optimal footprint 










decreases as h* increases. Next, we can use (12) and (14) to derive an optimal condition 








(1 ) ( ) ( , ) ( , , ) ln( )
ln( )( )








        
 
(15) 
 The LHS of (15) is strictly decreasing in h* while the RHS of (15) is strictly 
increasing in h*, so h* can be uniquely determined by (15).9 After solving for h*, we can 
use (14) to derive ω*, then use (13) to pin down A*.  
 The following proposition summarizes how property tax (τ) affects lot size (A*), 
living space (A*ω*h*) and building height (h*). 
Proposition:  
(A) If { ( , ) ( , , )} 0f N Z r       , an increase in property tax will not affect lot 
size, living space or building height. 
(B) If { ( , ) ( , , )} 0f N Z r       , an increase in property tax will reduce lot 
size, living space and building height. 
Proof.  See Appendix. 
 Given that the property tax remains an important source of revenue to provide 
local services,10  changes in property tax may lead to changes in ( , )f N Z . Both property 
																																																								
9	If 0  , the condition for the existence of h* requires that 
1
( , ) ( , , ) 1B b f N Z r        (see the 
Appendix).	
10	This is true in the United States and many other nations but not in all countries. 
	 11
tax and ( , )f N Z  can affect the unit rent of housing services which will influence the 
builder’s construction decisions. If the property tax is merely a benefit tax used to 
provide local services, any changes in property tax will not affect the unit rent of housing 
services. Then, the builder’s profit will remain unchanged because the negative effect of 
the tax rate on rent is completely offset by the positive effect of the improved local 
services, which can be equivalently expressed as { ( , ) ( , , )} 0f N Z r       .11 
Consequently the construction decisions of A*, K*, and h* will not be affected by changes 
in property tax.  
 On the other hand, if the property tax is not fully reflected by the provision of 
local services ( { ( , ) ( , , )} 0f N Z r       ), an increase in property tax will lower the 
marginal benefits of increasing building height and lot size, causing the LHS of (12) and 
(13) to shift downward. As a result, a higher property tax leads to lower building height 
and smaller lot size. Given (14), it is easy to show that ω*h* decreases with h*. Then, the 
living area, which is the product of A* and ω*h*, will also be reduced as a result of an 
increase in property tax.  
As Zodrow (2001) points out, it is difficult to distinguish between the claim that 
property tax is simply a tax on beneficiaries of local public services and the claim that it 
is a distortionary tax on the use of capital within a local jurisdiction. Regardless of these 
different views of property taxation, it is not unreasonable to expect 
{ ( , ) ( , , )} 0f N Z r       . Thus, Proposition (A) and (B) suggests a possible 
empirical test for the benefit tax hypothesis by testing for no significant effect of the 
																																																								
11 This can be easily shown by the envelope theorem: * { ( , ) ( , , )} 0S f N Z r    

       if 
{ ( , ) ( , , )} 0f N Z r        
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property tax rate on the lot size, living area and building height of new houses. If property 
tax significantly affects lot size, living area, and building height, it provides evidence that 
that the property tax is not a pure user fee.  
One important extension of our model is to allow characteristics of the 
surroundings (N) and land related regulations (Z) to influence the cost of acquiring a 
building lot. For example, 2 can be a function of N and Z. This simple extension will 
allow the model to explain richer empirical patterns about the impacts of local 
characteristics and land related regulations on building height, living area and lot size. 
For example, an improvement in N (holding other things constant) will raise the unit rent 
of housing services (positive effect), thereby encouraging a taller building structure and a 
greater value of ω*h*. Meanwhile, the improvement in N will also increase the acquisition 
cost of a building lot (negative effect). In addition, both positive and negative effects can 






























       

 (16) 
where 2  is changed from a constant to a function of N and Z. The positive effect 
increases the numerator of the RHS of (16) while the negative effect also increases the 
denominator of the RHS of (16). If the positive effect dominates, the improvement in N 
will lower both lot size and living area. Otherwise, lot size will drop, but the change in 
living area will depend on whether the increase in ω*h* will outweigh the decrease in A* 
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or not. The overall impact of the improvement of local characteristics on residential 
construction decisions is therefore an empirical matter.12 
 
EMPIRICAL DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 We study property tax effects on residential development in 41 towns in New 
Hampshire between 1985 and 2006. Lot size, living area, and building height of newly 
constructed single family homes are regressed on variables suggested by the conceptual 
framework in the previous section.13 The explanatory variables include property taxation, 
public expenditure on local services, land use regulations, physical/location 
characteristics, and local economic conditions.  
The starting point for our empirical study was collection of property tax rates for 
all towns and cities in New Hampshire, 1985-2006.  These local rates, expressed as 
dollars owed annually per thousand dollars of assessed value, have been made 
comparable by adjusting them to 100 percent of estimated market value.  These effective 
tax rates varied during the study period and among study towns by a factor of more than 
ten.  This substantial variation in tax rates among towns and across the years allowed us 
																																																								
12	In the extended model, the condition to neutralize the impacts of property tax on residential construction 
decisions will be a bit more complicated than the one presented in the Proposition. However, if 
{ ( , ) ( , , )} 0f N Z r       , 2{ ( , )} 0N Z N   and 0N    , it is easy to show that an increase 
in property tax will reduce lot size, living space and building height. 
13 Econometrically we might attempt to estimate the lot size, living area and building height equations 
simultaneously. Estimating simultaneous equations of a structural model, however,  requires that we have 
good instruments.  We tried to estimate the structural model of the three equations but had difficulty 
finding instrumental variables that would pass the standard tests for good instruments.  Given that we did 
not find good instruments and since our objective was to examine the net impact of property tax on the 
three dimensions of land development, we chose to estimate the reduced form equations of lot size, living 
area, and building heights. Because we used the same explanatory variables in the three reduced form 
equations, the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is equivalent to the ordinary least squares (OLS). We 
have reported the results of OLS estimation with the White corrected standard errors.  
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to detect effects of property taxation on residential construction choices.  In estimating 
our regression models, we correlated the property tax rate of one year with construction 
decisions of the following year.  This use of a lagged relationship was intended to clarify 
the direction of causation between the property tax and construction variables.14  
 In an effort to capture the impact of local public expenditures on land prices and 
hence on residential construction decisions, we have included real per pupil expenditure 
(PerPupExp) on elementary public schools in our empirical models.  Because these 
school expenditure data are for academic years that begin during the autumn, there is a 
modest lag relationship between per pupil spending, on the one hand, and our three 
construction variables, on the other hand. 
 Our next step in data collection was to gather data on the physical characteristics 
and construction years for new single-family homes built during our study period.  
Because property assessments in New Hampshire are conducted by the towns and cities, 
not by county or state assessors, we solicited the cooperation of 234 local assessors.  
Because many of these assessors could not provide data in electronic form or could offer 







included	in	the	model.		It is also possible that the tax variable can be correlated with variables of regional 
characteristics that are not included in the regression. To control for possible omitted variable bias, county 
dummy variables (county fixed effects) and the interaction effects of county and year (year	of	original	
construction)	dummies were included in the regression. We did not include town dummy variables 
because we wanted to be able to examine the effects of some important town characteristics such as 
distance to a central business district and land scarcity index (that was virtually constant during the period 
studied).  
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for 41 towns and cities.  These data included lot size, living area of structure, number of 
stories, access to water, and year of original construction.15 
 Per capita personal income data at the town level are available from the U.S. 
Census Bureau for 1979, 1989 and 1999.  We have estimated per capita income (PCI) for 
other years of our study period by assuming that the growth rate of town PCI was a 
constant proportion of the actual growth rate of county PCI for inter-census years.  
Because of residential sorting by income class, we expect that per capita income of 
existing residents serves as a proxy for the personal income level of new homebuyers 
(Watson 2009).  This suggests that higher per capita income would be associated with 
both larger lots and also more spacious houses.  To the extent that higher per capita 
income of existing residents is an amenity attracting new residents, however, it raises 
land prices, thereby reducing lot size and inducing substitution towards larger house size. 
 Newburn and Berck (2006) show that local zoning regulations and provision of 
water and sewerage services can affect density on the metropolitan fringe. Our 
conceptual framework also suggests that zoning regulations can affect the optimal 
choices of lot size, living space, and building height for a developed parcel. We have 
included two variables to capture the effects of zoning on residential construction 
decisions.  A zoning dummy simply measures whether a town had adopted zoning 
regulations before or during the year of construction.  We expected that the mere 
presence of zoning would raise land prices, in part by making building lots more 
																																																								
15	Full disclosure requires us to point out that our lot size and building square footage data are for 2007 or 
2008 and not for the original year of construction.  Hence, we do not know how many properties in our 
sample have seen further subdivision of lots or structural additions to the house since the original 
construction took place.  For some observations, then, it is conceivable that the house was originally on a 
larger (or perhaps smaller) lot with less (or perhaps more) floor space. 
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attractive and in part by restricting the supply of buildable lots.  The other variable 
interacts the zoning-in-effect dummy with minimum residential lot size.  Our expectation 
was that large minimum lot sizes might force some developers to build on larger lots than 
they would have chosen if there had been no local zoning rules.  
 Because town’s accessibility affects land price and the rent people are willing to 
pay, we have also included two measures of a town’s highway accessibility to the 
regional economy, three measures of a parcel’s access to water or mountain views, and 
one measure of land scarcity within our study towns.16  Many towns in southern New 
Hampshire have become exurbs of metropolitan Boston during the past forty years.  
Thus, if a town has immediate access (less than five miles) to one of the region’s 
interstate highways, we interact an access dummy with road mileage to Boston.  Finally, 
we use year-of-construction dummy variables in our regression models to see whether 
there are vintage effects that cannot be explained by the other time-series variables: per 
capita income and tax rates.  County dummy variables are also included to capture the 
unobserved heterogeneity across counties.  
Except for the nine county dummies to capture county fixed effects and the 
interaction terms between country and year-of-construction dummies, the variables in our 
regression models are described in Table 1.  Summary statistics of the relevant variables 
for all towns are presented. Lutz (2009) has found that the effects of local taxation can 
																																																								
16	We constructed our land scarcity index as follows.  The NH Department of Revenue Administration 
issues annual reports on the number of acres in each town or city enrolled in the current-use assessment 
program.  These are larger parcels of privately owned land that could be subdivided for development 
purposes but that are presently tax-favored agricultural, forest or open space lands.  The smaller the 
percentage of a locality’s total area consisting of current-use acreage, the higher its land scarcity score.  
Scarcity of developable acreage within a locality presumably raises lot prices faced by homebuilders.  
	 17
differ substantially within New Hampshire according to proximity to Boston.17 In Table 
1, we also present the summary statistics of variables for the sample split between 
southern and northern towns. The southern towns are those within fifty miles of Boston. 
On average, properties in southern towns have smaller lot size but larger living area. The 
average property tax rate is slightly lower but the average per pupil expenditure is slightly 
higher in northern towns. The average distance to a highway exit is significantly longer in 
northern towns. The differences between southern and northern towns will be explored in 
our empirical analysis. 
 Our empirical analysis starts with the Box-Cox estimation that suggests a log 
transformation for the lot size and living area variables.  Further, following the findings 
in Lutz (2009), differential effects of property taxation in southern and northern towns are 
allowed in the estimation.   
Estimation results for two models are presented in the remainder of this paper. 
Model 1 is the base model without spatial tax effects; Model 2 allows differential tax 
effects between southern and northern towns. The estimation results for these models are 
summarized in Table 2 (Models 1 and 2).18 
 
																																																								
17	Cho, Clark, Park and Kim (2009) also find evidence of substantial spatial variation in the housing 
market. 
18	As a robustness check of our empirical results, we include the following additional variables in our 
regression models: inflation-adjusted construction cost index for Manchester (the R.S. Means City Cost 
Index adjusted by the GDP deflator of the same year), New Hampshire residential fuel oil prices and 
national mortgage rates. They serve as the proxies for real construction costs, real operating costs and real 
interest rates which we believe should correlate negatively with living areas and building heights. Because 
those additional variables do not vary across towns, we use year of construction instead of time dummies 
(the interaction terms between time and county dummies are dropped as well) to re-estimate Models 1 and 
2. The conclusion about the impacts of property tax on residential construction decisions remains 
unchanged except that (1) the impacts (in absolute value) become smaller and (2) an increase in property 
tax does not significantly affect lot size in southern New Hampshire towns.	
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ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 In Model 1, we correlate the three physical dimensions of newly constructed 
homes with lagged values of the property tax rate and real per pupil expenditure for our 
entire sample of New Hampshire localities. In Table 2, we see that higher property tax 
rates are associated with smaller lot sizes, suggesting that property tax is not a pure 
benefit tax in the New Hampshire land market. Note that heavier property taxation is also 
significantly associated with the construction of homes with fewer stories and less living 
space, a result consistent with the view that, on net, the local property tax discourages 
capital investment.   
 We also find evidence in Model 1 that higher levels of real per pupil expenditure  
encourage building structures with more stories and more living space but smaller lot 
size. The control variables for per capita income, zoning, location, and amenities are 
significant and their coefficients have the expected signs. In general, as shown in Model 
1, an improvement in positive surrounding characteristics or a reduction in the negative 
surrounding characteristics favors construction of taller building, which is consistent with 
the prediction of our analytical model. In addition, Model 1 reveals a generally negative 
relationship between lot size and positive surrounding characteristics. According to our 
analytical model, land values must have increased more than the unit rent of housing 
services for better surrounding characteristics to be associated with a smaller lot size. 
 In Model 2, we pursue the earlier finding of Lutz (2009) that the effects of local 
taxation differ substantially by location within New Hampshire.  More specifically, we 
split our sample into those southern towns and cities that are less than fifty miles from 
Boston and those that are more remote from the region’s largest city.  As shown in Table 
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2, higher tax rates are associated with smaller lot size, smaller living areas and fewer 
stories of height in both subsamples of localities.  This negative association is larger in 
northern towns and cities. 
 Note that Model 2 implies a partial correlation of lot size and the tax rate that 
differs substantially between the immediate exurbs of Boston and more northerly 
communities.  Lutz (2009) speculates that localities closer to Boston have tighter zoning 
regulations and fewer buildable lots, a situation that would result in a lower supply 
elasticity for residential land in those communities.   
 Although our Model 2 attempts to control for land scarcity and for the presence of 
zoning in the year of construction, our measures are far from perfect.  We suspect that the 
southern towns, where zoning regulations have typically been in effect for more years 
than in the north (see the summary statistics in Table 1), have stricter zoning provisions 
and tougher enforcement of those land use regulations.  Hence, we are not surprised that 
Model 2 implies a much stronger negative association of the property tax with lot size in 
the north of New Hampshire than in the south. This result suggests that the design of new 
residential properties is less sensitive to property taxation in communities closer to 
Boston. 
 What impact does property taxation seem to have on the capital intensity of newly 
built single family homes?  We tackle that question by calculating the elasticities of lot 
size, living area and building height with respect to the property tax rate at the variable 
means for each of our empirical models.  As reported in Table 3, Model 1 predicts that a 
ten percent increase in the tax rate would be associated with a 1.8 percent decline in 
living space and a 4.0 percent decrease in lot size.  That is, our simplest empirical model 
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predicts that a ten percent tax hike would increase the floor-area ratio of the average new 
home by about 2.2 percent.  Although this predicted impact is modest in magnitude, 
statistical significance tests confirm that this impact really exists.     
 Based on Model 2, we find that sorting our study towns into northern and 
southern piles makes a large difference.  In the southern communities, a ten-percent hike 
in the tax rate tends to reduce living space by nearly 1.6 percent and decrease lot size by 
more than 2.4 percent.  This implies an increase in the floor-area ratio of 0.8 percent 
associated with a ten-percent tax hike.  In sharp contrast with the communities closer to 
Boston, northern towns and cities are predicted to experience a drop in lot size of 4.3 
percent and a shrinkage in living area of 1.8 percent for newly constructed houses in 
reaction to a ten-percent hike in the property tax rate.  This suggests an increase in the 
floor-area ratio equal to roughly 2.5 percent.  As with many other facets of the real estate 
market, location seems to matter greatly as one assesses the impact of property taxation 
on building decisions.19   
 
REMARKS 
 Previously published theoretical analyses of the decision to develop vacant lots by 
placing structural capital on those land parcels have implied that higher property tax rates 
might reduce the amount of capital investment, thereby reducing the capital intensities of 
newly developed properties.  Our empirical evidence suggests the opposite that property 
taxes have impacted lot size more negatively than building size in both Southern and 
																																																								
19	For another discussion of the potential impact of the property ta on the capital/land ratios of new homes, 
see Ingram (2008). 
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Northern NH towns. Also, the significant effects of property taxation on the decisions of 
residential housing development provide some evidence that the property taxation is not 
merely a user fee and that it does affect allocation of residential capital across 
municipalities.   
 At the same time, our regression results suggest that, ceteris paribus, a higher per 
pupil spending level is associated with smaller lot sizes but larger living areas and more 
stories, presumably because better-funded public schools raises land prices more than the 
unit rent of housing services.  Once one accounts for both the tax and expenditure sides 
of local government budgets, it seems that relying on the property tax to fund public 
schools has a much smaller impact on building structures than on lot sizes. 
In this study, we did not investigate the impact of property taxation on the timing 
of a developer’s decision whether to develop a piece of land or not.  It is likely that 
property taxation not only influences the physical design of residential houses but also 
the timing of development. Future research to examine the impact of property taxation on 
both the design and also the timing of residential development is warranted. 
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Descriptive Statistics for New Home Sample, 1985 – 2006  
  All Towns Southern Towns Northern Towns 
Variable Units/Definition Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std  












LivingArea Square Feet 2,166 854 2.442.83 794.85 2,222.28 884.14 
Height Stories 1.73 0.40 1.81 0.36 1.70 0.41 
YearBuilt Calendar Year 1994 6.63 1994 6.25 1994 6.75 
Pop2000 #Residents in 2000 20,695 28,332 22,115 10,179 20,246 31,989 
PerCapInc Per Capita Income in 













LandArea Town Size in Acres 22,041 8,270 18,327 3,248 23,218 8,998 
PropTax $ per $1000 Value 18.70 6.56 20.30 6.08 18.19 6.62 
lagPropTax $ per $1000 Value 19.17 6.55 20.77 5.85 18.66 6.68 
PerPupExp Per Pupil Expenditure in 













YearZone Zoning in Effect Year 1958 16.34 1952 7.91 1960 17.79 










































DistXway Distance to Interstate 













NearExit  Dummy=1 if <5 Miles 













Waterfront Water Front Dummy 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.26 
PctWater Percentage of Town 



























LandScarcity Land Scarcity Index 0.68 0.95 1.00 0.70 0.58 0.99 


















Effects of Property Tax on Residential Land Development Decisions  
 
Note: 1. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, 0.5, and .1 levels, respectively. The White 
corrected standard errors are in parentheses.  
2. In addition to the variables presented in the table, the above models also include dummy variables 
for counties, years, and the interactions of counties and years to capture the county and year fixed 
effects. The base county for comparison is the Belknap County and the base year for comparison 
is 1985. 
 































   









































































































































Property Tax Rate Elasticities 
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Proof of the Proposition 
First we show that the condition for the existence of solution requires that  
  1
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B
b f N Z r   


 when 0      (A1) 
When 1  and 0  , the optimal condition that determines h* is described in 
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 (A2) 
It is clear that, when 0 1  , the optimal solution of building height always 
exists and is unique because the LHS of (15) and (A2) strictly decrease from infinity to 
zero and the RHS of (15) and (A2) strictly increase from 1 to infinity as h* increases from 
0 to infinity. However, when 0  , the LHS of (15) should not be less than the RHS of 
(15) at h* = 0, which leads to the parameter restriction described by (A1). 
 
Case (A): { ( , ) ( , , )} 0f N Z r        
 It is easy to show that an increase in property tax will not affect lot size, living 
space or building height when { ( , ) ( , , )} 0f N Z r       . It is because 
( , ) ( , , )f N Z r    is the only (separable) component that involves  and N in the profit 
function. Since { ( , ) ( , , )} 0f N Z r       , any marginal changes in the property tax 
will not affect the initial value of ( , ) ( , , )f N Z r   . Therefore, the optimal solution of 
lot size, living space or building height will remain unchanged. 
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Case (B): { ( , ) ( , , )} 0f N Z r        
 An increase in property tax will shift the LHS of (15) and (A2) downward. Since 
the LHS of (15) and (A2) are strictly decreasing in h* and the RHS of (15) and (A2) are 
strictly increasing in h*, an increase in property tax will reduce h*. 
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          
 (A3) 
 The RHS of (A3) can be used to define an alternative profit function as follows: 
  
1
( , | ) ( ) (1 )(1 ) ( , ) ( , , ) hh B b h b f N Z r c h                 (A4) 
 By maximizing ( , | )h   with respect to h and ω, it is easy to show that the first-
order conditions are identical to (11) and (12). In other words, the optimal solutions for 
building height and footprint ratio are the same between (A4) and the original profit 
function (10). Then, we can modify (A3) as follows: 
  * 1 * *2 ( ) ( , | )A A h
            (A5) 
By taking the derivative of (A5) with respect to τ, it yields
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 (A6) 
(A6) implies that an increase in the property tax will reduce A*. 
Given (14), it is easy to show that ω*h* increases with h*. Then, an increase in the 
property tax will also reduce ω*h*. Since living area is the product of A* and ω*h*, an 
increase in the product tax will reduce living area.  
